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Abstract 
It has been argued that the media ownership is an influential factor determining the content production and 
performance of the media. However, knowledge about the characteristics of the media ownership and its impacts 
on the coverage of general election by the media has been less researched. Judging by such developments, this 
work raises the following question: how did the oligarchic ownership of the Indonesian news television channels 
determine the ways in which they covered two candidates who ran for president in 2014? By selecting TV One 
and Metro TV as a case study, this work extracts reports on the ways in which these news TV channels have 
produced news content related to the 2014 general election using qualitative and thematic content analyses. The 
findings are as follows: In the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, both TV One and Metro TV failed to comply 
with the ideal journalistic principles of covering both sides, objective and balanced reporting, as required by the 
Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, while broadcasting news about the two presidential candidates. Instead, 
the television stations preferred to broadcast the polarized news coverage of the presidential candidates. TV One 
appeared to show more support for the Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa presidential candidate pair, while Metro TV 
favoured the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla presidential candidate pair. This suggests that oligarchic media ownership 
strongly influenced the content production and performance of these news TV channels. They were used by 
oligarchs who have the media company to convey their personal political agendas in the hope that it will influence, 
or even set, the public’s agenda. 
Keywords: Indonesian presidential election, polarized coverage, oligarchy, media ownership, agenda-setting and 
news television channel 
 
Abstrak 
Gagasan kepemilikan media adalah faktor berpengaruh yang menentukan produksi dan penampilan media 
produksi telah banyak diusulkan. Akan tetapi, pengetahuan tentang sifat kepemilikan media dan dampaknya 
terhadap liputan pemilihan umum yang dilakukan oleh media masih kurang ditelaah. Dengan mempertimbangkan 
perkembangan tersebut, penelitian ini ingin mengajukan pertanyaan: bagaimana kepemilikan oligarkis saluran 
televisi berita Indonesia menentukan cara media tersebut meliput dua kandidat presiden yang mencalonkan diri 
untuk posisi presiden Indonesia 2014? Memilih TV One dan Metro TV sebagai studi kasus, penelitian ini 
mengekstraksi laporan mengenai cara saluran TV berita ini menghasilkan konten berita terkait pemilu 2014 
menggunakan analisis konten kualitatif dan tematis. Temuannya adalah sebagai berikut: dalam acara Pemilihan 
Presiden Indonesia 2014, TV One dan Metro TV gagal mematuhi prinsip-prinsip jurnalistik yang ideal seperti 
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mencakup kedua belah pihak, obyektif, dan seimbang, seperti yang diberlakukan oleh Komisi Penyiaran 
Indonesia, ketika menyiarkan berita tentang dua kandidat presiden. Sebaliknya, stasiun televisi lebih suka 
menyajikan liputan berita terpolarisasi pada kandidat presiden. TV One menunjukkan lebih banyak dukungan 
untuk kandidat Presiden-Wapres Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa, sementara Metro TV untuk Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla. 
Ini menunjukkan, kepemilikan media oligarkis sangat memengaruhi produksi dan kinerja konten oleh saluran TV 
berita ini. Mereka digunakan oleh pelaku-pelaku oligarki yang memiliki perusahaan media untuk menyampaikan 
agenda politik pribadi mereka dengan harapan hal itu akan mempengaruhi, atau bahkan menetapkan, agenda 
publik. 
Keywords: Pemilihan umum presiden RI, Polarisasi liputan, Oligarki, Kepemilikan media, Agenda setting dan 
saluran televisi berita 
 
Introduction 
Television remains to be a popular mass 
media product amongst Indonesians. It has a 
penetration rate of up to 90 percent out of the total 
population (Utomo, 2017). When it comes to 
monitoring the national politics, television is still a 
top choice next to newspaper and digital media 
(Idrus, 2018). One of the reasons is that television is 
more up-to-date with information distribution than 
print media but it is much more accessible to many 
people than online media. Even it is  more relevant 
when applied to monitoring national election, 
especially presidential election: an event with 
nationwide impact that the public demand to be kept 
continuously updated with the latest information. 
The Indonesia Broadcasting Commission’s 
Broadcasting Practice Guideline and Broadcasting 
Program Regulations stipulate  that all television 
stations using public frequency must stay politically 
neutral and well-balanced when airing a news 
coverage, for the sake of the public's interests. 
Additionally, they must cover both sides of the story 
every time they report or cover an event (KPI, 2012). 
However, in Indonesia’s 2014 Presidential Election, 
TV One and Metro TV,  which  use public frequency 
chose to disregard this regulation by airing rather 
polarized coverage of the two presidential 
candidates. TV One  broadcast in favour of   the  
Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa  pair, while Metro TV showed 
more support for the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla  pair.  
Judging by the developments, this work 
raises the following question: how did the oligarchic 
ownership of the Indonesian news TV channels 
determine the ways in which they covered the two  
candidates who run for president in 2014? Focusing 
on this question, this work contends that the  culture 
of oligarchic media ownership in Indonesia is  an 
influential factor that determines the ways in which 
media events are covered, such as the presidential 
candidates since they stepped into the 2014 
presidential election race. 
In his work Indonesian News TV Channels 
and Polarized Political Issues, Nyarwi Ahmad 
mentioned Indonesian Media in the Post-Soeharto 
regime. He then elaborated the polarization of the 
political issues in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential 
Election. In response to that, this article is aimed to 
explore a different focus of polarization by 
emphasizing  the oligarchic culture within the said 
media system through an observation of the 2014 
Presidential Election. It will furthermore provide an 
alternative analysis of the political polarization trend 
throughout  the Indonesian Presidential Election 
season in the past ten years. It is also deemed to be 
important to track and monitor the social, cultural,  
political and  economic dynamics affected by this 
culture. Using agenda-setting theory and framing 
function of media, it adopts a case study method to 
draw conclusions about the production culture, 
readership and economic, technological and political 
constraints operating on the media and also 
Indonesia in general. A detailed analysis of 
television news coverage, particularly by TV One 
and Metro TV, of 2014 Presidential Election of 
Indonesia will be chronicled. First, however, it will 
be valuable to discuss definitions and introduce some 
background to the Indonesian media. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
1. Indonesian oligarchic media ownership 
 Oliver Worth refers to the term oligarch as a 
group of individuals who are primarily concerned 
with economic expansion and dominance instead of 
political power (2017). Similarly, Jeffrey A. Winters 
explains the definition of oligarch as actor(s) “…who 
command and control massive concentrations of 
material resources that can be deployed to defend or 
enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social 
position” (Winters, 2011). Contextually amongst 
Russian society, an oligarch can also be someone 
who has sufficient control over resources, and 
therefore, they can be politically influential 
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(Melander, 2010). In the US, Donald Trump could be 
considered to an embodiment of an oligarch. In the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the 
oligarchization of their media ownership began in 
2010, when Western investors started to gradually 
back out of CEE (Stetka, 2016). 
The oligarchic system in the Indonesian media is 
a legacy left by the authoritarian era of New Order. 
The New Order is a term used to characterize 
Indonesia’s second president, Soeharto’s regime as 
he rose to power in 1966. It is then used to address 
the era of his presidency (1966-1998). During this 
period of time, the Indonesian media was completely 
under the government’s control.  
There used to be only one TV station, 
Televisi Republik Indonesia or TVRI. TVRI is now 
known as a public television channel or station, but 
during Soeharto’s regime, ‘government television 
channel’ would have been a more proper title. In the 
past, TVRI was used by the government to shape 
viewers’ nationalism mentality. It was also used to 
convince people of how great the government was 
and why they needed to continue to elect Soeharto as 
their president (Steele, 2011). As illustrated in the 
article Reading the Movement of Television by 
Indonesian independent communication and media 
studies center, RemoTivi, the government used to 
utilize this channel to slowly shape a nationalism 
mindset amongst its viewership. After the no-ads 
policy was established in 1981, the government 
lacked the necessary funding to produce programs 
that could attract viewers. This encouraged the 
government to allow commercial TV stations to 
operate. Such policy was directed to keep viewers 
from switching to foreign television, which they 
believed would endanger national stability 
(RemoTivi, 2014).  
In the early 1990s, private television stations 
started to emerge and until the end of the decade five 
private television stations established themselves: 
Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (RCTI), Surya 
Citra Televisi (SCTV), Televisi Pendidikan 
Indonesia (TPI), Andalas Televisi (ANTV), and 
Indosiar. The first three were, at that time, a part of 
President Soeharto’s business empire 
(Kartosapoetro, 2014). RCTI was owned by 
Bambang Trihatmodjo,  Soeharto’s third son, and 
TPI was owned by Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, 
Soeharto’s first-born. SCTV was owned by Henry 
Pribadi and Sudwikatmono, businessmen who were 
close friends with the Soeharto family. ANTV was 
and still is owned by Bakrie Group and Agung 
Laksono who held important positions in Soeharto’s 
political party. Meanwhile, Indosiar was owned by 
Liem Sioe Lion’s Salim Group which was within 
Soeharto’s inner circle (RemoTivi, 2014).   
In addition to its ruling position in the 
political sector, President Soeharto’s family were 
also dominant in the business and economic sector. 
The family owned television and radio networks, 
chemical factories, shipping lines, pharmaceutical 
companies, banks, hotels, shopping malls, paper and 
pulp mills, and taxi companies. Those companies, 
along with companies owned by his close friends 
were given access to exclusive supply contracts, 
control of state-run monopolies, and special tax 
breaks during his 31 years in office (Sandbrook, 
2016). In that period also, Soeharto and his family 
managed to reap between $15 and $35 billion from 
the state, which works out to between $480 million 
and $1.13 billion per year (Watson, 2014), making 
him the all-time most corrupt world leader in the 
world.  
By 1998, the Soehartos' assets were 
estimated then to total $30 billion, which would have 
ranked them among the world's dozen richest 
families (Shenon, 1998). Until later in the same year, 
the Asian Financial Crisis brought Indonesia to the 
brink of economic collapse. Students, political 
activists, and even common people started rioting 
and demanding that Soeharto step down from his 
presidency. He finally resigned from his position on 
21 May 1998, ending the era of New Order. 
This era of political and economic oligarchy 
inevitably shaped the Indonesian media system and 
culture. Media professionals were not used to 
disclosing any negative news regarding the 
government and journalists who were being too 
critical were found ‘mysteriously’ dead or thrown in 
jail (Sidharta, 2016). Indonesia’s press freedom 
index was rated amongst the worst in the world by 
Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans 
frontiers, RSF). It also made it physically dangerous 
for Indonesian press to conduct any government-
exposing investigative journalism practices. The 
press was also used to working in a culture where the 
owners of their company were tied to those who have 
political power and interests.  
Since Soeharto’s downfall, although the 
media is now able to report news without 
government constrictions, the practice of 
independent journalism in Indonesia continued to be 
obstructed by obstacles such as a weak legal system 
that does not always guarantee the rights of 
journalists, fear of lawsuits by wealthy and powerful 
individuals who would hide behind Indonesian 
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criminal defamation law, which gives individuals 
leverage to sue journalists from exposing their ugly 
truths, including corruption, tax write-offs, etc. 
(Steele, 2011: 93), and threats of physical assault or 
personal attack from offended mobs (p. 85). The 
style of reporting also has not changed much: It often 
lacks full context and leans toward reporting on 
events instead of identifying any underlying causes 
(p.86). Newsrooms still believe that information is 
considered valid and more trustworthy when it 
comes from or is confirmed by government/public 
official sources (p.92). 
  
2.      Media contents and its function as 
framer and agenda-setter 
According to Denis McQuail, there are 
several reasons why researchers study media content, 
one of these is to analyse and identify media bias. 
Intentionally or not, content of media is either always 
potentially open to the observation of favouring one 
side over another, or much of it has “…a clear 
direction of evaluation in relation to matters of 
dispute” (McQuail, 2010). Some of these researchers 
include Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky who 
coined the Propaganda Model of Mass Media in their 
book, Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media (1988). This model 
works within critical-Marxist tradition and basically 
argues that news discourses are created to serve some 
sort of propaganda function within capitalist, liberal-
democratic societies (Mullen & Klaehn, 2010, p. 
217). According to this model, there are five filter 
elements of news production processes. 
“The five filter elements [of news 
production processes] are (1) the ownership, size and 
profit orientation of mainstream media; (2) 
advertising as the principle source of revenue for 
mainstream media and the corresponding influence 
of advertising values on news production processes; 
(3) mainstream media’s routine reliance on agents of 
power as the primary definers of social reality; (4) 
organized flak that represents a mechanism of social 
control; and (5) various ideological forces, which 
may be deployed and adapted to correspond to elite 
interests when required (Mullen & Klaehn, 2010, p. 
218).” 
These interests as mentioned by Mullen & 
Klaehn are often reflected through one of the media’s 
most prominent functions, which is its function as 
agenda setter. Walter Lippmann, a prominent 
American journalist, was one of the first writers to 
formalize the idea that media have the potential to 
structure issues for the public. He argues that as the 
real environment is too big and too complex for 
direct acquaintance, and people are not equipped to 
deal with so much subtlety and so much variety, 
therefore a simpler model is needed before we can 
manage with it, and that is what media offers. 
Stephen W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss state in 
their book Theories of Human Communication 
(2010), that scholars have described media’s agenda-
setting as a function that establishes the relevant 
issues or images in the minds of the public. 
Agenda-setting theoretically describes news 
media’s ability to influence the importance of topics 
in the public agenda by frequently covering and 
reporting on it (McCombs & Reynolds, 2002). For 
newspapers, it is easy to point out which stories hold 
the most importance: Lead story on the front page, 
the size of the headline font, the size of the column, 
and so on. In addition, once a story is printed on a 
newspaper, it stays there. It is a physical artefact. On 
the other hand, with television, a story will be gone 
from someone’s attention once it has finished airing. 
Unlike a newspaper where people can read a story 
repeatedly and return to reference information, 
unless a viewer made an effort to record it, any 
information aired on TV cannot be repeated on 
demand. Therefore, television agenda setting has a 
more limited capacity. Which is why, time placement 
and frequency is the most effective ways to portray 
the saliency of a topic. The more urgent a story is 
considered, the more times it is repeated.  
According to Littlejohn and Foss, citing 
Dietram A. Scheufele’s work, agenda setting could 
be identified within two levels. The first one 
“…establishes the general issues that are important 
(object agenda setting), and the second determines 
the parts or aspects of those issues that are viewed as 
important (attribute agenda setting)” (p. 161). This 
article attempts to present an example of how this 
identification is applied by two different TV stations 
that were supporting two opposing politicians.  
 
Material and Methodology 
This work intends to answer the following 
question: how did the oligarchic ownership of the 
Indonesian news TV channels determine the ways in 
which such media covered two candidates who ran 
for president in 2014? Selecting the coverage by TV 
One and Metro TV as case studies, this research 
adopts the qualitative case study method as outlined 
by Cresswell (2014). The data were collected from 
reports and recorded broadcasts of these two 
channels from 1 June 2014 to 31 July 2014. The 
grounds for choosing this specific time frame are 
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based on the time of the announcement of the 
presidential candidacy until the end of the campaign 
period. In addition, more data were obtained from 
academic and journalistic articles to support the 
analysis.  
The data were analyzed using qualitative-
thematic content analysis method. As an independent 
qualitative descriptive approach, this method will be 
used to identify, analyze, and report patterns 
(themes) within the qualitative data in order to 
minimally organize and describe it in detail (Braun 
& Clarke, 2013). According to Braun and Clarke, 
employing this method can be done through a six-
step process. These steps are (1) familiarizing the 
data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for 
themes, (4) reviewing the themes, (5) defining and 
naming the themes, and (6) producing the report (p. 
123). However, not all six steps will be elaborated 
upon in detail in this research as the collected data 
were already specific in nature. Instead, this research 
will review the already-defined data and explore it 
through the elaboration of the findings in the 
discussion part of this research. 
 
Result and Discussion 
1. Polarized national television news 
coverage of the 2014 presidential election 
Indonesian politics has effectively used 
multi-party system for decades. According to 
Indonesia’s General Election Laws, number 42-
2008, section three, article nine: in Indonesian multi-
party election regulations, a party needs to win at 
least 20 percent of the seats in the House of 
Representatives, or win 25 percent of the popular 
vote in the legislative election to be able to nominate 
their presidential candidate (DPRRI, 2008). 
However, in the Indonesian 2014 Legislative 
Election, no single party gained above 20 percent of 
seats nor 25 percent of popular votes. The 
participating parties then formed two big opposing 
coalitions. Each coalition nominated a pair of 
Presidential and VP candidates. Koalisi Merah 
Putih, or Red and White Coalition, which consisted 
of Gerindra (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya/Great 
Indonesia Movement Party), Golkar (Partai 
Golongan Karya/The Party of the Functional 
Groups), PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional/National 
Mandate Party), Partai Demokrat (Democratic 
Party), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang/Crescent Star 
Party), PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/Prosperous 
Justice Party), and PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan/United Development Party) 
nominated Prabowo Subianto as Presidential 
candidate and Hatta Rajasa as VP candidate. On the 
other side, Koalisi Indonesia Hebat or the Great 
Indonesia Coalition, which consisted of PDIP 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 
/Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), PKB 
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/National Awakening 
Party), NasDem (Partai Nasional Demokrat/National 
Democratic Party), Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani 
Rakyat/People’s Conscience Party), and PKPI 
(Partai Keadilan Persatuan Indonesia/Indonesian 
Justice and Unity Party) nominated Joko Widodo as 
Presidential candidate and Jusuf Kalla as the VP 
candidate.  
The D-day of Indonesia’s 2014 Presidential 
election was set for July 9th, 2014. The campaign 
period for Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election 
started on June 4th and ended on July 5th, 2014, but 
the names of the candidates had been announced by 
the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum/General 
Elections Commission) on the 31st of May that year. 
The first week alone after the announcement, 
political content had escalated in the frame of the 
media conglomeration from the month before.  
According to an extensive research project 
by Remotivi, an Indonesian independent 
communication and media study, research, 
advocacy, and publishing centre, the number of news 
reports about politics broadcasted by 11 major 
Indonesian TV stations had multiplied by six 
compared to the previous month, from 512 to 3,305. 
Meanwhile, in regard to news revolving around the 
election, there were two particular stations with a 
notable imbalance when it came to reporting on the 
candidates. TV One’s reports and coverage 
conspicuously and fervently rooted for presidential 
and VP candidates Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa, and Metro 
TV for Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla. 
RemoTivi reported that during the first week 
of the campaign period, eighty percent of negative 
news broadcast by TV One was about Joko Widodo 
and twenty percent was about Jusuf Kalla. Twenty-
five percent of the negative news about Joko Widodo 
were talking about campaign violation allegations, 
another twenty-five percent was regarding rumours 
about Joko Widodo’s fake national identification 
card, another twenty-five percent about corruption 
issues, and the remaining twenty-five percent 
pertained to other negative news. On the other hand, 
fifty-two percent of the positive election news 
reports broadcast by the station were regarding 
Prabowo, and forty-four percent for Hatta Rajasa. 
Half of the news about Prabowo was regarding 
positive political survey trend, twenty-five percent 
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about people’s support for the candidate(s), and the 
remaining percentage was about other positive news. 
During this period, Metro TV instead, 
broadcast zero negative news coverage on Joko 
Widodo-Jusuf Kalla, sixty-five percent on Prabowo 
and thirty-five percent on Hatta Rajasa. In the sixty-
five percent negative coverage on Prabowo, twenty-
four percent were regarding the human rights 
violations, where Prabowo was accused of having 
orchestrated the abduction and torture of 23 
democracy activists toward the end of President 
Suharto’s rule in 1998. He was then a commander of 
the special forces, the military units allegedly 
conducting the abuses (Liljas, 2014). Furthermore, 
five percent of the negative coverage was on his pro-
American views, twenty-four percent on alleged 
campaign violations, ten percent regarding black 
campaign, and twenty-one percent was about alleged 
misuse of the national emblem. At the same time, the 
TV station broadcast only four percent positive news 
on Prabowo and Hatta Rajasa combined, while airing 
fifty-one percent positive news about Joko Widodo 
and forty-five percent about Jusuf Kalla. Fifty-nine 
percent of the positive news regarding Joko Widodo 
were about people’s support towards the candidates, 
nine percent lauding his excellent work as a 
governor, eight percent regarding positive political 
survey trends, and twelve percent concerning 
positive profiling by experts (Arief, 2014).  
Meanwhile, according to a survey conducted 
by KPI (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia/Indonesia 
Broadcasting Committee) during the second week of 
the campaign period, Metro TV aired news coverage 
on Widodo-Kalla 62 times, whereas the other 
candidates only 22 times. On the third week of the 
campaign period, TV One broadcast 153 news 
coverages on Prabowo-Rajasa and only 79 coverages 
on Widodo-Kalla. On the other hand, Metro TV aired 
187 coverages on Widodo-Kalla, while Probowo-
Rajasa only got 110 coverages (Karana, 2014).   
In addition to the unbalanced level of 
coverage provided by  the two TV stations  for the 
agenda of their preferred candidates, they also 
facilitated apparent black campaigns. Case in point, 
on June 30th 2014, TV One’s morning talkshow 
program Dialog Kabar Pagi (Morning Dialogue) 
invited Retired Brigadier General Priyanto, former 
Deputy Governor of Jakarta and former Territorial 
Assistant to  the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff. The 
segment was discussing a resurgence of communism 
and how much it could threaten national security. As 
an informant, Priyanto implied that PDIP had sent 
their people to China to learn from the Chinese 
Communist Party and that their presidential 
candidate, Joko Widodo, supported communism 
(Dasman, 2014). The TV station did not invite any 
representative from the opposing side, making the 
news segment appear to be extremely biased. The 
two stations also framed a news coverage differently 
for each candidate. When TV One broadcast a report 
regarding Prabowo and Hatta Rajasa, they paired it 
with a banner reading “Presiden Pilihan Rakyat 
(President of People’s Choice),” whereas they only 
labelled news regarding Joko Widodo and Jusuf 
Kalla as “Calon Presiden (Presidential Candidate).” 
On the other hand, when Metro TV aired a coverage 
about Prabowo-Rajasa, they tagged it simply as 
“Presidential Candidate,” but tagged Widodo-Kalla 
as “Presiden Pilihan Kita (President of Our Choice)” 
(Herawati, 2016).  
The polarized media coverage kept going on 
until the election was over. As reported by 
Bisnis.com, by 6 p.m. local time on July 9th 2014, TV 
One declared that Prabowo-Rajasa won the quick 
count vote. However, according to the candidate’s 
spokesman, they wanted to wait until at least ninety 
percent of the votes were counted before announcing 
their victory. At the same time, Metro TV had 
already announced Widodo-Kalla’s quick count 
victory. Widodo even made a statement where he 
thanked the people who had voted for him and all his 
supporters (Adlin, 2014). Eventually, on July 22nd 
2014 the National Election Committee announced 
that Joko Widodo officially won the election by 6.3 
percent margin over Prabowo and he was to be 
inaugurated on October 20th 2014. 
 
2. Indonesian Media System and How It 
Sets Agendas and Frames News for the 
Oligarchs  
When TV One broadcast news coverage on 
Prabowo 153 times within a week compared to 79 
times on Widodo-Kalla, the station intended to 
convince its viewers that in this election, Prabowo 
was more important than Widodo. Likewise, Metro 
TV’s decision to broadcast 187 news coverages on 
Widodo-Kalla while only giving 110 for Probowo-
Rajasa meant to posit that Widodo-Kalla is the more 
important topic in viewers agenda and in the context 
of the Presidential Election compared with Prabowo-
Rajasa. 
The first level of agenda setting establishes 
the general issues that are important, and the second 
determines the parts or aspects of the issues that 
make it important (Littlejohn & Foss, 2008, p. 293). 
This second level of agenda setting is also known as 
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framing. Media framing is necessary in the process 
of mass media reporting. Media depictions frame 
events by various textual features of the “story” such 
as headlines, audio-visual components, use of 
metaphors, the way in which the story is told, and 
many others. These ways were expected to constrain 
how the audience can interpret these events (p.294). 
For instance, by using the label “President of 
People’s Choice” to address Prabowo and “President 
of Our Choice” to address Joko Widodo, TV One and 
Metro TV were framing their respective candidates 
as someone that should be chosen as the president. 
Littlejohn and Foss also consider that media agenda 
is established by some combination of internal 
programming, editorial and managerial decisions, as 
well as external influences from non-media sources 
such as socially influential individuals, government 
officials, and commercial sponsors. But what was the 
actual factor or reason that influenced TV One to 
prioritize Prabowo and Metro TV to prioritize 
Widodo in their respective agendas? 
In Indonesia’s media scene, owners of major 
media companies are often directly affiliated with 
political parties. There are currently 14 national 
television stations operating in Indonesia. Four of 
them, RCTI (Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia), 
MNCTV (previously TPI or Televisi Pendidikan 
Indonesia), Global TV, and iNews TV, belong to 
MNC Group. This giant media corporation is owned 
by Hary Tanoesoedibjo, a billionaire businessman 
who has also been involved in national politics as a 
former member of Nasdem, before joining Hanura, 
and now has founded his own political party, Partai 
Persatuan Indonesia/Indonesian Unity Party 
(Perindo) (Brown, 2017).  
Another example of affiliation between 
media and political figures is the case of TV One and 
Metro TV. Metro TV, established in November 
2000, offered a news-oriented broadcasting concept. 
It is also the first Indonesian national TV station that 
broadcasts 24 hours non-stop, and the only station 
that does not air soap opera programs. Metro TV is 
operated under Media Group, a media holding 
owned by Surya Paloh, a former member of the 
Golkar advisory board, before chairing Nasdem in 
2013 until present. In the Indonesia’s 2014 
Presidential Election, Nasdem was one of the parties 
in the Great Indonesia Coalition, a coalition 
supporting Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla. TV One is 
instead, owned by Visi Media Asia, Ltd., along with 
Andalas Televisi (ANTV). Visi Media Asia is a 
subsidiary of Bakrie Global Ventura of Bakrie 
Group, a large holding company owned by Aburizal 
Bakrie, former Coordinating Minister of Economy, 
former Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, 
and current Chairman of Golkar (Jegho, 2015). As a 
matter of fact, Golkar was one of the member parties 
which supported Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa in Red and 
White Coalition. Paloh and Bakrie used their power 
as the owners of their respective media companies to 
set their agenda: to portray the candidates they 
supported as someone worth voting for and the 
opposing candidates as a failure. Therefore, TV One 
chose to broadcast negative news on Widodo-Kalla 
and positive news on Prabowo-Rajasa, and on the 
other hand, Metro TV focused on Widodo-Kalla’s 
achievements and supports while showing Prabowo-
Rajasa’s weaknesses.  
These media owners did not even try to be 
subtle in using their media companies for their 
political agenda. Between March and July 2008, 
Indonesian book author and mass-communication 
expert, Ignatius Haryanto, conducted a research on 
the impact of concentrated media ownership on 
journalism practice. Haryanto interviewed four 
working journalists from different media groups, 
with one of them being a running text reporter at 
Metro TV. This informant attested that Surya Paloh 
did not shy away from using his media to advance his 
political and economic interests. Paloh also openly 
stated that he “…used Metro TV and Media 
Indonesia as his political vehicle, declaring “if I can’t 
use them, what else can I use? If there are any 
journalists who disagree with this situation, they are 
free to leave Metro or Media Indonesia. I don’t want 
to be hypocritical”” (Harsono, 2004 in Haryanto, 
2009, p. 111).  
Following the ideas of Robison and Hadiz, 
Tapsell (2015, p. 31) argued that such embodiment 
of media control indicates one of the crucial elements 
that constitute an oligarchy. Oligarchic media 
owners generally shape news and information 
according to their wishes (Tapsell, 2015, p. 34). In 
his article Indonesia’s Media Oligarchy and the 
Jokowi Phenomenon, he explains that many scholars 
have concluded that Indonesian media today is 
largely operating in a free market-driven 
environment, where audience and readership heavily 
determines what and how news is produced. 
However, he also states that at the same time, there 
has been an “…increasing concentration as well as 
on the role that powerful owners play in limiting 
information” (Tapsell, 2015, p. 34). 
Stefaan Walgrave and Peter Van Aelst (2006 
cited in Littlejohn & Foss, 2008, p. 294) mention that 
the power of media to affect the public depends on 
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various factors, such as “…media credibility on 
particular issues at particular times, the extent of 
conflicting evidence as perceived by individual 
members of the public, the extent to which 
individuals share media values at certain times, and 
the public’s need for guidance.” In the case of 
Indonesian readership, or rather viewership, deeply 
rooted oligarchic culture within Indonesian media 
professionals led to similar mentality amongst 
Indonesian audiences. According to many scholars 
such as Phillip Kitley (2000) and Mark Hobart 
(2006), it was Indonesian people’s “obsession” with 
analog television that prompted oligarchic control of 
the media in the first place. It currently “…dominates 
the media market, being the medium with the most 
reach and popularity.” Even in 2014, with more 
access to cable TV and internet, television, along 
with newspaper, was still considered the main source 
of information for Indonesians, especially those who 
were not familiar with cable TV and internet 
(Tapsell, 2015, pp. 31-32).  
For decades, television has been the primary 
source of information and entertainment for 
Indonesians, with a government-controlled channel 
being the only option they had. They had been 
taught, or more likely indoctrinated, to believe that 
everything they see on television is true, valid, and 
legitimate. They had never been given alternative 
information, making them used to seeing things from 
limited perspective. These factors have moulded 
Indonesian viewers to become complacent and 
uncritical when it comes to information. They had 
learned not to second-guess, especially information 
about and/or obtained from government officials. 
Even by January 2016, only 4.6 percent of 
Indonesian households had access to cable TV 
(Wulandari, 2016) which offers more options of 
programs, including international news that could 
potentially set a different standard and perspective on 
news quality. Which is why, people with positions of 
power in this oligarchic media system take advantage 
of the situation by easily “feeding” the public with 
information that suits their own interests. Although, 
later on, free market national television post-New 
Order era overwhelmed Indonesians with a wide 
range of entertainment choices such as sports, 
foreign films and shows, soap operas, and cable 
television, Indonesian audience have never had the 
chance to receive proper education on media literacy.  
 
Conclusion 
The polarization of TV One and Metro TV 
coverage in reporting news on the Indonesia 2014 
Presidential Election candidates was a result of the 
oligarchic media ownership over the two TV 
stations. As the respective owners of both TV 
stations were also involved in the parties which were 
backing the candidates, they used their media 
companies to deliver their personal political agendas 
in the hope that it would influence or even set the 
public’s agenda. Now there has been no proof that 
Joko Widodo’s victory was a direct result of Metro 
TV’s successful agenda-setting attempts. However, 
the competition between the two stations in 
supporting their favourite candidate was reflected in 
the result of the election where the votes were split 
by a very thin margin. When compared to the 
following presidential election in 2019 through a 
review written for Asian Politics & Policy by Nyarwi 
Ahmad (2019), it can be generally concluded that the 
polarization was still present. However, instead of 
focusing on the candidates’ personal ‘dirt’, the media 
polarization throughout the 2019 presidential 
election focused on identity politics and religion 
(Ahmad, 2019). This could potentially be an 
interesting topic to be explored more in future 
research. 
Oligarchic culture has existed for too long 
and runs too deep within Indonesian media system, 
including television. It has shaped the way  in which 
Indonesian media operate and practice their 
functions in the society. It also has moulded 
Indonesian viewers’ mindset to never question the 
truth or anything beyond what is conveyed by the 
media, even now when they are presented with a 
wide variety of programs and channels. It is a win 
situation for media owners, advertisers, their 
political collaborators, or anyone who might want to 
easily shape the public’s mind. But it is a definite loss 
for Indonesian viewers who deserve media that holds 
their best interest as its priority. 
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